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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HARRY ALEXANDER, RALPH H. 
ALEXANDER and EVELYN ALEX-
ANDER HOWICK, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant, 
and 
HANNAH WILSON ALEXANDER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8042 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a decree entered by the trial 
court, sitting without a jury. The facts involved in this 
case were not in serious dispute at the trial and the sole 
question raised by this appeal is whether or not the tria1 
court erred in its application of the law to the facts pre-
sented. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they were 
beneficiaries under a certain trust agreement dated Jan-
nary 10, 1930, executed by Henry A. Alexander, Emily J. 
Alexander and Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company and 
an amendment thereto dated July 2, 1940; that certain de-
scribed property was the subject matter of the alleged trust 
and that by its terms the trust was ripe for distribution 
to the beneficiaries (R. 1). The complaint further alleged 
that liannah \Vilson Alexander, Appellant, claimed an in-
terest in said property adverse to that of plaintiffs'. Plain-
tiffs prayed that the alleged trust be terminated, the prop-
erty distributed according to its terms and that the claims 
of Hannah \Vilson Alexander be declared invalid and title 
quieted against her. 
A stipulation was filed by the parties to this action re-
citing that the defendant Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Com-
pany had no interest in the controversy herein involved, 
and that it should continue to hold said real property as 
trustee and to abide by the outcome of this action (R. 17). 
Hannah \V ilson Alexander will be referred to in this brief 
as Defendant. 
Defendant answered plaintiff's complaint denying gen-
erally the allegations concerning the trust agreement and 
admitting that she asserted a claim in and to said property 
adverse and hostile· to plaintiff's claim (R. 9). As a Cross 
Complaint, defendant alleged that during his life time, 
......... 
Henry A. Alexander purchased from Louis De Young and 
Louise S. DeYoung, his wife, the property in question, paid 
the full purchase price therefor, and became the owner of 
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~ complete legal and equitable title thereto; that he caused 
t: and directed the sellers to convey legal title to Zion's Sav-
.... 
... 
ings Bank & Trust Company and at all times subsequent 
to that time was the owner of full and complete equitable · 
title to said property and was in possession thereof during 
his life time and at the time of his death; that at the time 
the property was so acquired defendant was the lawful 
wife of Henry A. Alexander and survived him as his widow; 
that she had at no time parted with or relinquished any 
of her right, title, inchoate dower or interest in said prop-
erty and is and at all times has been the owner in fee 
simple of undivided one-third interest of said property. 
The Cross-Complaint prayed that her interest in said prop-
erty be decreed and that the plaintiffs' claim against said 
interest be quieted and that the alleged trustee be ordered 
to convey to her legal title to an undivided one-third inter-
est in said property. Plaintiffs' Reply in substance denied 
the claim of defendant (R. 12). 
Subsequent to the commencement of this action, the 
parties .entered into an agreement allowing Zion's Savings 
Bank & Trust Company to sell the real property and to 
hold the proceeds of said sale pending the determination 
of this cause (R. 57). 
The case was tried by the Court, sitting without a 
jury, and after hearing the evidence and arguments of 
counsel, the Court granted judgment to the plaintiffs as 
prayed in their complaint and ordered that the proceeds 
from the real property be distributed fo the plaintiffs as 
provided in the trust agreement. It is from the Decree of 
the trial court that this appeal is taken. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 10, 1930, Henry A. Alexander and Emily 
J. Alexander, his wife, entered into the following agree-
ment with Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company (R. 4) : 
TRUST AGREEMENT 
TIIIS AGREEMENT made and entered into at 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this tenth day of January, 
A. D., 1930, by and between HENRY A. ALEX-
ANDER and EMILY J. ALEXANDER, his wife, 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, FIRST PARTIES, herein 
called "TRUSTORS", and ZION'S SAVINGS BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, a corporation, of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, SECOND PARTY, herein called 
"TRUSTEE", WITNESSETH: 
THAT, WHEREAS, the said Trustors desire to 
create a Trust respecting the property hereinafter 
described, for the benefit of the survivor of them, 
and for the benefit of their heirs hereinafter named, 
and for other reasons; 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration 
of the foregoing, and of the sum of ONE ($1.00) 
DOLLAR in hand paid, receipt whereof is hereby 
acknowledged, and of the performance of the terms 
of this Trust by the Trustee, the said Trustors have 
sold, assigned, transferred, set over and conveyed,· 
and by these presents do sell, assign, transfer, set 
over and convey unto the said Trustee all of that 
certain real estate and personal property described 
in a list hereto attached, marked "EXHIBIT A", 
hereby referred to and made a part of this trust 
agreement. 
It is mutually agreed that all of the property 
above described, mentioned and refer~ed to· shall be 
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called the "TRUST FUND", and that the said Trus-
tors may, at their option, add to said Trust Fund by 
depositing with and assigning and conveying to the 
Trustee other property, money or securities, and 
all such additions shall become a part of the Trust 
Fund, and be subject to all of the terms and condi-
tions hereof. 
All of the said Trust Fund shall be held and 
disposed of by the Trustee strictly for the follow-
ing uses and purposes and upon the following trusts, 
to-wit: 
1. Said Trustors hereby expressly reserve unto 
themselves, jointly, and to the survivor of them, the 
right to receive all of the income from said Trust 
Fund, and expressly reserve the- right to revoke and 
terminate this Trust in whole or in part at any 
time during the joint lives of Trustors, or the life-
time of the survivor of them, and they, and the 'sur-
vivor of them, expressly reserve the right to change 
the beneficiaries herein named, and to change or 
modify the nature of the Trust hereby· created, or 
the terms and conditions thereof in any respect. 
Such revocation or change shall be in writing signed 
by said Trustors, during their joint lifetime, and 
thereafter by the survivor of them, or by their at-
torney-in-fact thereunto duly authorized, but no par-
ticular or technical form thereof shall be required, 
and no such revocation or change need be acknowl-
edged. Upon the- revocation of this Trust, as above 
provided, the Trustee will assign, without recourse, 
or quitclaim back to said Trustors, or to such per-
son as they, or the survivor of them, may designate 
in such revocation or change, all such property as 
may be included within the revocation or change. 
2. During the lifetime of said Trustors, and 
the survivor of them, all taxes, assessments, insur-
ance premiums, and all other costs, expenses, debts 
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• 
and obligations of said Trustors, or either of them, 
in connection with the property included in this 
Trust, shall be paid by the said Trustors, and the 
survivor of them, and the Trustee shall not be re-
sponsible or liable in any manner for the nonpay-
ment of any such taxes, assessments, premiums, 
costs, expenses, debts and obligations of any name 
or nature whatsoever. 
3. If, upon the death of the survivor of said 
Trustors, this trust shall not have been revoked in 
full, as to all of the property covered hereby, then 
out of such as shall remain subject to this Trust, 
the Trustee shall pay the costs and expenses of the 
last sickness and funeral charges of said survivor 
and shall deduct for its compensation as Trustee 
hereunder such fees and expenses as are usually 
charged in like cases; and all of the rest, residue 
and remainder of said Trust Fund shall be distrib-
uted as follows : 
One-half (lh) to HARRY ALEXANDER, 
son of Trustors, if he be then living, and if not, 
then in equal shares to his then living heirs. 
One-half (lf2) to RALPH HENRY ALEX-
ANDER, grandson of Trustors, and EVELYN 
JUNE ALEXANDER, granddaughter of Trus-
tors, share and share alike, with the under-
standing that if said two grandchildren be min-
ors at the time the distribution of the Trust 
Fund shall take place, the Trustee shall con-
tinue to hold in trust the respective shares to 
which said two grandchildren are entitled h~re­
under, until they become of legal age, at which 
time their respective portions of the Trust Fund 
shall be delivered and paid over to them. If, · 
however, before two said grandchildren become 
of legal age, Trustee shall · deem it advisable or 
necessary to pay from their respective shares 
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for their support, mainte·nance, care or educa-
tion, authority is hereby vested in said Trustee 
to pay such sums and at such times as Trustee 
shall, in its business discretion, consider neces-
sary and advisable to supply for said two grand-
children proper care, support, maintenance and 
education. In the event that either of said two 
grandchildren shall die before receiving the full 
portion of the Trust Fund to which he or she is 
entitled hereunder, the share of such deceased 
grandchild shall go to the surviving grandchild, 
if there be a survivor, and if not, then such 
share shall go to Harry Alexander, son of Trus-
tor, ..... or his then living heirs. 
4. In order that the terms and conditions of 
this Trust may be fully consummated, said Trustee 
is hereby authorized and empowered to sell any 
part or all of the said Trust Fund, at private or 
public sale, without notice to or confirmation .of any 
court, and is further vested with full power and 
authority to comply with all legal- requirements as 
to the execution of writings, deeds, leases, assign-
ments,. conveyances and other documents and for-
malities, without the confirmation of any court; and 
is authorized to pay from the Trust Fund all ex-
penses and costs necessary for the fulfillment of this 
Trust, or the protection of the property covered 
hereby, or the prosecution or defense of any action 
or proceeding in which any of the Trust Fund may 
be involved. 
5. The respective interests of beneficiaries in 
the Trust Fund created hereby shall in no case vest 
in such beneficiaries until they, respectively, shall 
become entitled to receive and demand, absolutely 
and forthwith, the income or principal of the said 
Trust Fund to which they, respectively, may be en-
titled hereunder, and such beneficiaries shall have 
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· no control whatsoever over, or interest in said Trust 
Fund except as herein provided ; and they shall have 1 1 
no right or authority to assign or anticipate any 
income or share to which they may be entitled under 
the provisions of this Agreement, and the interests 
of said beneficiaries, and each of them, either in the 
principal or the income shall not be liable in any 
manner or to any extent for the obligations or lia-
bilities, voluntary or involuntary, of the ,said bene-
ficiaries, or either or any of them, of whatsoever 
character. 
6. In the event that there shall be no bene-
ficiaries, named herein, living at the time of the 
final distribution of the said Trust Fund, then, and 
in this event, the entire Trust Fund shall revert to 
the estate of Henry A. Alexander, and be distributed 
in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah 
governing estates of deceased persons. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the said Trustors 
have hereunto set their hands and seals, and the 
Trustee to signify its acceptance of the Trust hereby 
created, has caused these presents to be executed on 
the day and year herein first above written. 
(s) Henry A. Alexander 
(s) Emily Jane Alexander 
FIRST PARTIES 
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK & TRUST COMPANY 
BY (s) Wm. McEwan, Its Cashier 
SECOND PARTY 
Certain real property described in the exhibit to the 
trust agreement (R. 7) had been acquired by Henry A. 
Alexander in 19?0 by a Warranty Deed in which he was 
the sole grantee (R. 52). 
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:, Subsequent to the execution of this agreement, Emily 
-: J. Alexander died. On November 3, 1936, Henry A. Alex-
ander was married to Defendant, Hannah Wilson Alex-
~ ander, sister of his first wife, at Salt Lake City, Utah. On 
~: May 21, 1940, Henry A. Alexander executed an instrument 
entitled "Withdrawal of Property From Trust'' which de-
r· 
.. 
scribed the real property referred to in the exhibit to the 
:: trust agreement, acknowledged receipt of this property 
and released the trustee from any obligation in relation to 
it (Exhibit 4). The property was then conveyed, at his 
request, to Louis De Young and Louise S. De Young, his wife. 
In consideration for the transfer by Henry A. Alexander 
of the property withdrawn from the trust, the DeYoungs, 
at his request and pursuant to an agreement with him con-
veyed to Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company the real 
-· property involved in this case, known as 685 East 3065 
South, Salt Lake County, Utah. -... 
On July 11, 1940, almost four years after his marriage 
to defendant, Henry A. Alexander addressed a letter to 
Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company for the purpose of 
amending the trust agreement (Exhibit 2). This letter 
reads as follows : 
Zions Savings Bank and Trust Company 
Trustee Under Trust No. 324 
Gentlemen: 
Pursuant to the right reserved in the above 
agreement to change the terms thereof, I have 
elected and do by these presents elect to change. the 
provisions of said agreement as follows: 
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My wife, ·Emily J. Alexander, named in said I. 
agreement is now deceased and I have remarried;· 
my present wife's name is Hannah Wilson Alex-
ander, and I desire that the following paragraph 
shall be incorporated in the original trust agreement 
as though originally a part thereof : 
"In the event Hannah Wilson Alexander shall 
survive Ifenry A. Alexander she shall be .entitled to 
the use and occupancy of the family home at 685 
East ~065 South, for so long as she shall desire to 
occupy the same. This right in her, however, shall 
not extend to a life estate so that she would be en-
abled to rent the property to a third person, but it 
shall be confined to her personal use and occupancy. 
In the event there are funds in the Trust Estate for 
the payment of taxes on said property and its main-
tenance, she shall have the use and occupancy as 
aforesaid free of all expense or upkeep and the 
taxes ; _but in the event there are not funds in the 
Trust Es~ate for the payment of these items, it will 
necessarily be her oblig~tion to pay the same as they 
fall due. If the said Hannah Wilson Alexander does 
not survive Henry A. ~lexander, then upon his death 
distribution of the Trust Estate. shall ·be made as 
hereinafter provided. If she does survive him, then 
upon her death, such distribution shall likewise be 
made." 
Further I hereby declare said original · trust 
agreement as hereby a~ended to be in full force and 
effect. 
(s) Henry A. Alexander 
TRUSTOR 
During the remainder of his lifetime, Henry A. Alex-
ander paid the taxes on the above property and had the 
full and unrestricted possession and control thereof (R. 
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4). He and his wife, Hannah Wilson Alexander, lived upon 
said property after its acquisition until his death in June, 
1943 (R. 45). From the date of her husband's death until 
May, 1952, the defendant continued to reside on the prop- . 
erty, make the necessary repairs to the home and premises, 
and paid all of the taxes (R. 46). Since May of 1952, due 
to her advanced age and_ poor health, the defendant has 
lived with her son (R. 27, 46). She was unable to appear 
at the trial of this case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT HER ONE-THIRD STATUTORY IN-
TEREST IN SAID PROPERTY SINCE THE 
PURPORTED TRUST WAS ILLUSORY AND 
TESTAMENTARY IN NATURE AND SHOULD 
NOT liAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO DEFEAT 
HER INTEREST. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT HER UNDIVIPED ONE-THIRD 
STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID.PROPERTY 
SINCE HER DECEASED HUSBAND IN ANY 
EVENT OWNED THE F'ULL AND COMPLETE 
EQUITABLE TITLE TO SAID PROPERTY IN-
CLUDING ALL INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT HER UNDIVIDED ONE-THIRD 
STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY 
SINCE IN ANY EVENT HER INTEREST 
WOULD HAVE ATTACHED AT THE TIME 
TilE PROPERTY WAS PURCHASED AND 
CONVEYED TO THE TRUSTEE. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER 
TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE 
DEFENDANT AT ANY TIME RELINQUISHED 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT HER ONE-THIRD STATUTORY IN-
TEREST IN SAID PROPERTY SINCE THE 
PURPORTED TRUST WAS ILLUSORY AND 
TESTAMENTARY IN NATURE AND SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO DEFEAT 
HER INTEREST. 
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the trial 
court erred in holding that under the facts as stated above 
the .appellant, Hannah Wilson Alexander, was not entitled 
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to an undivided one-third interest in said property or the 
proceeds thereof. Defendant's claim to an interest in this 
property arises by virtue of Section 7 4-4-3 U. C. A. ( 1953) 
which reads in part as follows : 
"One-third in value of all the legal or equitable 
estates in real property possessed by the husband at 
any time during the marriage, to which the wife 
has made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be 
set ~part as her property in fee simple, if she sur- . 
vives him. " 
So far as defendant has been able to ascertain, with 
the exception of the argument made under Point III, this 
Court has never considered the issues similar to those raised 
by this appeal. The decisions of this Court have, however, 
tended to favor the upholding of the wife's statutory dower 
interest whenever it could possibly be justified under the 
facts of the particular case. 
It is defendant's first contention_ that the purported 
-
trust created by defendant's husband and his former wife 
was illusory and testamentary in nature and was, for the 
purpose of determining defendant's rights under the above 
statute, void. An examination of the provisions of the pur-· 
ported trust agreement as they existed at the time defen-
dant and Henry A. Alexander were married reveals that 
duri.ng his lifetime, he parted with nothing. While the in-
strument in form purports to create a trust, in substance 
it in no way changed his ownership or control over the 
property. During his lifetime, he retained the power to 
revoke the trust, to change the beneficiary, to modify its 
terms in any respect he desired and in addition he retained 
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the full and complete beneficial use and enjoyment of the 
property ( R. 4) . He was in no way restricted in his power 
to ~ell or dispose of the property, as indeed the sale of the 
first parcel of property held in trust indicates. During 
Alexander's lifetime, the Bank had no right to control or 
manage the trust res in any manner whatsoever. He was 
required by the agreement to pay the taxes and in fact did 
so until his death. Had Henry A. Alexander retained a fee 
simple title, he could not have had any greater rights or 
powers over this property. Complete fee simple ownership 
in property gives one the uncontrolled right to enjoy the . 
use of the san1e in any manner he pleases and to trans~er 
or convey it in whole or in part during his lifetime or upon 
his death. I-Ienry A. Alexander had all of these rights. He 
parted with nothing until his death. The trust agreement 
was purely testamentary. 
The validity of a purported trust very similar to that 
involved in this case was considered by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Betker 
v. Nalley, 140 F. 2d 171 (1944). The trust in that case con-
tained two parcels of land. The settlor retained the bene-
ficial use of the property during her lifetime together with 
the power to direct the trustees to convey or mortgage· the 
land at any time. Upon her death, the property was to be 
sold and the proceeds divided among certain of the settlor's 
children. The trust was thus in all respects similar to the 
one involved in this case. After considering the question, 
the Court concluded that such a trust was testamentary in 
nature and invalid. At page 173, the Court states: 
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"The only thing the grantor parted with irre-
vocably was the remainder of the trust property, if 
there should be any remainder after her death; and 
the only possibility that any discretion or power 
might have to be exercised by her trustees after her 
death arose from the possibility that she might elect 
not to dispose of the entire trust property before 
her death. Even in that event they were to be mere 
channels through which title would flow for the pur-
pose of distribution. It seems obvious, therefore, 
that the deed of June, 1930, was ineffective to create 
a I trust. Instead, it was, and was intended to be, 
merely testamentary in character." 
In many cases where Courts have been faced with this 
question, it has been held that where the settlor parts with 
nothing during his lifetime, no valid trust is created and 
unless the statutes relating to the execution of wills are 
complied with, the conveyance must fail. 
In Warsco v. Oshkosh Sav. & Tr. Co., 182 Wis. 458, 
196 N. W. 829 (1924), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
held: 
"An instrument whereby donor retains or may 
retain _the whole beneficial interest in trust prop-
erty by execution of the instrument according to its 
terms does not constitute a valid trust. In 
such cases the so-called trustee is only the agent -of 
the donor. And it has uniformly been ·held that a 
devise or bequest in trust which is subject to the 
future directions of the donor is void unless executed 
in conformity with the statute of wills." 
A number of cases have considered the validity of 
trusts of this type under similar circumstances to those 
raised in the present case. Under the laws of New York, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
a widow is allowed to elect upon the death of her husband 
whether or not she will take her intestate share or property 
devised to her by her husband. An exception to this rule 
is made in the case where a valid trust has been created 
with income payable to the surviving wife. The New York 
Courts have uniformly held that a trust such as involved 
in the present case is invalid so far as'· defeating the wife's 
election to claim an outright interest in the property. In · 
l'leunnan v. Dore, 175 N.Y. 371, 9 N. E. 2d 966 (1937), the 
deceased husband had created a trust with income reserved 
for life, power to revoke and control over the trustee in the 
management of the property. After first determining that 
the intention of the settlor was not material, the Court held 
the purported trust invalid. The opinion specifically notes 
that: 
"The settlor reserves substantially the same 
rights to enjoy and control the disposition of the 
property as he previously had possessed." 
The Court's conclusion is summarized as follows: 
"Judged by the substance, not by the form, the 
testator's conveyance is illusory, intended only as a 
mask for the effective retention by the settlor of 
the property which in form he had conveyed. We 
do not attempt now to formulate any general test of 
of how far a settlor must divest himself of his in-
terest in the trust property to render the conveyance 
more than illusory. Questions of whether reserva-
tion of the income or of a power of revocation, or 
both, might even without reservation of the power 
of control be sufficient to show that the transfer 
was not intended in good faith to divest the settlor 
of his property must await decision until such ques-
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tion arises. In this case it is clear that the settlor 
never intended to divest himself of his property." 
For other New York cases reaching the same result, 
Burns v. Turnbull, 294 N. Y. 889, 62 N. E. 2d 
785 (1945) 
Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 286 N. Y. S. 
814 (1936) 
Other Courts considering the question have reached the 
same conclusion: 
Bolles v. Toledo Trust Company, 144 Ohio St. 
195, 58 N. E. 2d 381 ( 1944) 
Harris v. Harris, 72 N~ E. 2d 378 (1947) 
Russell v. Webster, 213 Mass .. 491, 100 N. E. 
637 (1913) 
Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 97, 8 Atl. 744 (1887) 
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Section 57 
(2) reads as follows: 
"Where the settlor transfers property in trust 
and reserves not only a beneficial life estate and a 
power to revoke and modify the trust, but also such 
power to control the trustee as to the details of the 
administration of the trust that the trustee is the 
agent of the settlor. The disposition so far as it is 
intended to take effect after his death is testamen-
tary and invalid unless the requirements of the stat-
utes relating to the validity of wills are complied 
with.'' 
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The most that can be said for the trust agreement in 
question is that it constituted Zion's Savings Bank & Trust 
Company a mere agent or bailee of Henry A. Alexander 
during his lifetime. If, as the cases above indicate, a trust 
is invalid where the settlor retains a life interest plus the 
power to revoke the trust and control the management of 
the trust res, then certainly the present trust must fail. 
In the present case, the trustee was given no duties what-
soever during the lifetime of Alexander. The property was 
in the settlor's possession and subject to his sole and ex-
clusive control and management. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that at least for the purpose of determining the ex-
istence and validity of a wife's statutory dower right, this 
trust cannot be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT HER UNDIVIDED ONE-THIRD 
STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY 
SINCE HER DECEASED HUSBAND IN ANY 
EVENT 0\VNED THE FULL AND COMPLETE 
EQUITABLE TITLE TO SAID PROPERTY IN-
CLUDING ALL INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP. 
By its very terms, Section 74-4-3 U. C. A. (1953) gives 
to the wife an undivided one-third interest in the equitable 
estates in real property possessed by the husband at any 
time during marriage.. ~ssuming the trust created by 
Henry A. Alexander was valid, how can it possibly be de-
nied that during his lifetime he had an equitable estate 
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in the property in question? The very most that the trustee 
held was the bare legal title. The settlor retained the very 
greatest interest in this property possible without having 
legal title. Even in states not having an express statutory 
provision, it has been held that a wife may claim dower 
in her husband's equitable estates. 
Fletcher v. Felker, 97 F. Sup~. 755 (1951) 
It might be argued that the equitable estate of' defen-. 
dant's husband was limited to a life estate and thus dower 
could not attach. Such a construction, however, would ren-
der the term "equitable" as used in the statute, meaning-
less. All equitable estates in one sense of the word term-
inate upon the death of the owner. The beneficial use nec-
essarily ceases at that time. However, if any equitable es-
tate can be deemed a fee simple, then the interest of the 
settlor under this trust should certainly qualify since in 
addition to the full beneficial use he had the power to con-
vey the property outright, change the beneficiary who 
would receive it upon his death or ·even modify the trust 
to provide that it would continue beyond his lifetime. The 
only limitations present were those restricting the creation 
or existence of any equitable interest. For a case holding 
that the unequivocal power of absolute disposition elevates ' 
an equitable life estate into a fee simple, see National 
Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 121 S. E. 291 (1924). 
It has been said that whether or not dower attaches to 
a particular estate is dependent upon whether or not the 
husband at the time of his death is in a position to enforce 
a conveyance of the property. 
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Kathman v. Sheehan, 331 Ill. 420, 163 N. E. 
692 (1928) 
Under this test, certainly the wife's statutory dower right 
should attach, since as noted above, her husband at the time 
of his death had the uncontrolled power to convey the prop-
erty. 
While there are relatively few cases considering the 
question of whether or not dower attaches to the equitable 
estate of a beneficiary under a trust, the Courts that have 
considered the question, have had little difficulty upholding 
the wife's dower interest. In Chalk v. Chalk, 291 Ky. 702, 
165 S. W. 2d 534 (1942), the Court noted: 
"It may be observed that there is a distinction 
bet\veen a husband's mere equity in land or the hold-
ing of title as an agent or trustee and an equitable 
title of a character that entitles him to have or en-
force a conveyance of the legal or fee simple title,, 
i. e., \Vhen he is seized of a beneficial interest. The 
decedent Jule Chalk had such title. Therefore, it 
makes no difference whether it should be held that 
the decedent had legal title to the property subject to 
the liens of his son, or that he owned an equitable · 
title, for it is manifest that the son 'was seized of 
an estate in fee simple' for the use of the father. 
That being the condition, the widow had dower in it. 
The wife's inchoate right of dower attached when the 
property was acquired, and not having joined in the 
conveyance of the part sold in 1929, her potential 
right became consummated as a vested one at the 
husband's death and the widow is entitled to have 
it recognized." 
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In the more recent case of Pursifull's Adm'x v. Pursi-
full, 299 Ky. 245, 184 S. W. 2d 967 (1944), the same Court 
said: 
"In the absence of a specific statute there is 
some conflict in the decisions as to whether a widow 
is entitled to dower in an equitable estate of her 
husband, but, as said in 17 Am. Jr., Dower, § 39: 
'A freehold interest as cestui que trust is now rec-
ognized as an adequate basis for dower, since in 
many states the statutes specifically or by necessary 
implication provide for dower in equitable estates, 
or, as some of the authorities put it, a dowable qual-
ity is imparted to trust estates by the statutes.'" 
- . F. 
The case of Meyer v. Barnett, 60 W. Va. 467, 56 S. yl. 
206, was almost identical to the case at bar. A husband 
conveyed property to a trustee for the use and benefit of 
himself and to collect the rents, issues and profits and to 
pay to him the net amount thereof after expenses. The 
husband had the absolute and unlimited power of disposi-
tion over the land and coulq direct the trustee to convey 
it to whomever he pleased. Upon his death, that portion of 
the property that was undistributed was to be conveyed 
to his children. After considering the argument that the 
most the husband had was a life estate, the Court concluded 
that, looking at the instrument as a whole, the grantor-
husband remained the owner of at least an equitable estate 
in fee simple and the widow was entitled to dower in the 
land. The Court was impressed by the fact that although 
the income from the property would only be paid to the 
grantor during his lifetime, he had ·the absolute power of 
disposition over the property. 
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Other cases have recognized a wife's right to dower 
in a husband's equitable estate of this nature. 
Burhans v. Burhans, 121 Atl. 749 (N. J. Eq. 
1923) 
Wildeman v. Wildeman, 130 Atl. 717 (N. J. Eq., 
1925) 
Telis v. Telis, 132 N. J. Eq. 135, 26 Atl. 2d 249 
(1942) 
Fletcher v. Felker, 97 F. Supp., 755 (1951) 
Pope v. Bain, 6 N. J. 351, 78 Atl. 2d 820 (1951) 
If the word "equitable" in the Utah dower statute is 
to be given any effect whatsoever the defendant in this 
case is entitled to her statutory one-third interest in the 
property held in trust for her husband dur~ng his lifetime. 
Henry A. Alexander had as great an equitable estate in this 
property as could oonceivab~y have been created. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT HER UNDIVIDED ONE-THIRD 
STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY 
SINCE IN ANY EVENT HER INTEREST 
WOULD HAVE ATTACHED AT THE TIME 
THE PROPERTY WAS PURCHASED AND 
CONVEYED TO THE TRUSTEE. 
Apart from the above arguments, there is a third basis 
upon which the defendant's dower right can and should be 
sustained. On May 21, 1940, Henry A. Alexander withdrew 
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Ub ~ from the trust the real property described in the exhibit 
to the original trust agreement (Exhibit 4). On the same 
day, pursuant to an exchange agreed upon between them, 
this property was conveyed by Zion's Savings Bank & Trust 
Company to Louis DeYoung by a quitclaim deed and Louis 
De Young and Louise S. De Young, his wife, conveyed to the 
trustee the property involved in this litigation. At that 
time, Henry A. Alexander executed a form provided by the 
trustee stating that "I now deliver to you the following:" 
and described the property (Exhibit 3). There was no 
doubt a contract or agreement between Henry A. Alexander 
:: : and Louis De Young pursuant to which this sale or exchange 
took place. A reading of the letter signed by Alexander 






that prior to the DeY oungs' formal conveyance to the trus-
tee, Henry A. Alexander became the full legal and equitable 
owner of this property. Thus the statutory dower right of 
the defendant became fixed as of that time. 
Even if it be assumed that legal title to the property 
did not pass through Alexander in the transfer: between the 
time he contracted to purchase the property from DeYoung 
and the actual conveyance to the trustee, he would have still 
become the equitable owner of the property under an exe-
cutory contract of purchase. The cases uniformly hold that 
a husband's equitable interest in property under a contract 
of purchase is subject to a wife's dower interest. 
This question was considered by this Court in McNeil 
v. McNeil, 61 Utah 141, 211 Pac. 988 (1922). The question· 
there presented was whether dower attached to a husband's 
interest under an installment contract or certificate of sale 
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with the State for the purchase of land. In that case, be-
fore completing the payments, the husband_ entered into 
an agreement to convey a one-half interest in the land to 
another party. After completing the purchase price, the 
third party brought suit to compel specific performance 
of the contract and to recover his interest. The wife as-
serted her dower in an attempt to defeat this action. The 
Court held that since the purchase price had not been fully 
paid that no dower right attached prior to the sale to the 
third party. The Court noted, however, that a wife would 
be entitled to dower if the husband had performed his part 
of the contract and would have been in a position to com-
pel specific performance. In Young v. Corless, 56 Utah 
564, 191 Pac. 647 (1920), this Court had held that a pur-
chaser under such a contract was possessed with an equit-
able estate of inheritance "that could be mortgaged, one 
that could descend to his heirs, and such as could· be alie-
nated or encumbered as other real estate." In the McNeil 
case, this pronouncement was qualified to the situation 
where the purchaser had performed. I;n view of the Young 
case, it would have been difficult to deny that a wife would 
be entitled to dower under such circumstances. When read 
with the earlier dower cases of Parks Estate, 31 Utah 261, 
87 Pac. 900, and Free v. Little, 31 Utah 449, 88 Pac. 407, 
there can be no doubt that upon the completion of payment 
or other performance by the purchaser, his interest would 
be such that his wife's dower right would attach. 
The· cases on this point from other jurisdictions are 
collected and summarized in an Annotation in 66 A. L. R. 
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~ 65. As to the rule where the purchaser has performed his 
~ part of the contract, the author states : 
JI. 
"According to the weight of authority,. a wife 
has dower in lands which her husband holds at the 
time of his death under an executory contract of 
purchase where the purchase price has been fully 
paid and the husband is in a po~ition to compel a 
conveyance to himself of the legal title. While the 
reasons which the courts give for supporting this 
rule are not uniform, they are generally based upon 
the theory that in such a case the vendor is consid-
ered to be a trustee of the legal title for the benefit 
of the purchaser, and some courts hold that such a 
complete equitable title is an 'estate of inheritance' 
within the meaning of the dower statutes." 
For an example of the cases upholding the wife's dower 
right in this situation, see: 
In re Reids Estate, 26 Cal. App. 2d 362, 79 Pac. 
2d 451 
In re Kellchers Estate, 133 Misc. 581, 232 N. Y. 
8.680 
In re Bosharts Estate, 177 N. Y. S. 567, aff'd 
177 N. Y. S. 574 
Ehrlich v. Tritt, 316 Ill. 221, 147 N. E. 40 
Knights v. Knights, 300 Ill. 618, 133 N. E. 377 
We emphasize that the original property was with-
drawn from the trust by Henry A. Alexander. After with-
drawing the original property from the trust, he used it 
to purchase and acquire the property that is ·now the sub-
ject matter of this action. The legal situation presented is 
exactly the same as it would be if Henry A. Alexander had 
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purchased the property for cash and directed the seller to 
convey the legal title to a trustee. The moment Henry A. 
Alexander withdrew the original property from the trust 
he became the owner of the complete legal and equitable 
title. He used this complete legal and equitable title to 
purchase the property now in litigation. Having paid the 
full purchase price for the property in litigation, he be-
came the owner of the full and complete equitable title to 
it. He could not cut off his wife's inchoate dower by di-
recting the DeY oungs to convey the legal title to the trustee. 
POINT IV 
THERE \VAS NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER 
TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE 
DEFENDANT AT ANY TIME RELINQUISHED 
OR PART ED WITH HER INTEREST IN SAID 
PROPERTY. 
The trial court's decision in this case was in no way 
predicated upon the assumption that the defendant had re-. 
leased or relinquished her dower right. The Findings of 
Fact, however, were not specific enough ,to preclude this 
question from being raised. An argument to the effect that 
the defendant had surrendered he'r dower right was made 
by counsel of plaintiff, but jt gained no support from the 
facts of the case. 
It should be borne in mfnd that the amendment to the 
Trust Agreement, which purported to give the defendant 
the use and occupancy of the property after Henry A. Alex-
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ander's death was not executed until almost four years 
after the parties \Vere married. There was no evidence of 
an antenuptial agreement between the defendant and ~er 
husband. She was not a party to the Amendment and there 
was no reason to believe that she surrendered her dower 
rights in return for the privilege given to her under it. 
Counsel stressed the fact that the defendant owned real 
property at the time of her marriage and that she later 
disposed of said property. There was no relation shown, 
.: however, between her dealings in her own separate prop-
erty and the Trust created by her husband and the acqui-
sition of the property in question. The mere fact that she 
had property of her own in no way affects her dower right 
in her husband's property. 
.-
'· 
A wife's dower right both at common law and under the 
modified statutory provisions has been favored by the law, 
and the courts have been reluctant to find a release or re-
linquishment of a wife's dower right in the absence of a 
clear and unequivocal act on her part or where barred by 
specific legislation. 
Gee v. Baum, 58 Utah 445, 199 Pac. 680; 
Rook v. Horton, 190 N. · C. 180, 129 S. E. 450; 
Mathews v. Marsden, 230 Pac. 775, 71 Mont. 
502; . 
Taliaferro v. Alexander, 80 F. 2d 172. 
An examination of the record in this case- discloses no fact 
or circumstances that would support a finding that the de-
fendant had parted with her statutory one-third interest 
in the property allegedly held in t_rust for her husband 
Henry A. Alexander. 
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CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the evidence before the trial court, de-
fendant, IIannah Wilson Alexander, was entitled to her 
statutory one-third interest in the real property in question 
or the proceeds thereof. Whether the proposed Trust Agree-
ment is deemed a nullity or given full effect according to 
its terms, defendant was entitled to her dower interest. A 
contrary result would abrogate the plain and unambiguous 
meaning of Section 7 4-4-3 U. C. A. 1953, and contravene 
the strong policy in favor of safeguarding this right. Under 
the authorities and arguments presented herein, the Decree 
of the trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT H. BAGLEY, 
D. EUGENE LIVINGSTON, 
DAVID E. SALISBURY, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Received two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
this _______________________ day of ____________ :-________________ , 1953. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents 
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